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Abstract
It is possible to isolate three pillars of this emerging legal order which form the basis of any
discussion of the relationship between Community law and the laws of individual Member States.
These three pillars are the supremacy of Community Law, the effectiveness of Community Law in
national courts, and state liability for breach of Community Law.
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Hugh O'Flaherty*
INTRODUCTION
Since obtaining its independence in 1921, Ireland has had
two constitutions. Both constitutions were democratic and their
differences related more to problems of external sovereignty visd-vis Great Britain than to any difference on questions of democracy or the rule of law. Indeed, of all the democratic states that
were created in Europe after the First World War, the Irish democracy alone survived the vicissitudes of the following three decades.
Article 5 of the Irish Constitution' proclaims that Ireland is
a sovereign independent democratic state. Article 6 provides
that all the powers of government derive, under God, from the
people.' Furthermore, the Irish Constitution provides for a National Parliament comprising a Chamber of Deputies, DailEireann, with extensive powers, 4 a Senate with minor powers of revision,5 a Government, 6 and a President,7 whose powers are largely
formal but whose prime duty is to act as guardian of the Constitution. Articles 40 through 45 of the Constitution contain a
charter which protects the usual fundamental rights.8 Article 34
provides for the establishment of independent courts which include a High Court9 and a Supreme Court vested with the power
* Senior Associate Judge of the Supreme Court of Ireland. The author gratefully
acknowledges the assistance of Mr. Justice Donal Barrington, his colleague on the Irish
Supreme Court and formerJudge of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, and of Mr. David Herlihy B.C.L., Judicial Research Assistant at the Supreme
Court and High Court of Ireland.
1. IR. CONST. art. 5.
2. Id.
3. Id. art. 6.
4. IR. CONST. arts. 15.1-15.15.
5. Id. arts. 15.1, 18-19.
6. Id. arts. 28.1-2.
7. Id. art. 12.
8. Id. arts. 40-45.
9. Id. art. 34.3.1.
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to set aside any act of Parliament which violates the Constitution. 10 Finally, Article 46 provides for the amendment of the
Constitution by referendum. All of these Articles caused difficulty for Ireland when it joined the European Economic Community. Amending the Constitution would have appeared a very
drastic solution to the people of Ireland and might have caused
considerable popular unease. Instead, the Irish Government
chose to by-pass these Articles by a simple amendment to Article
12
29 of the Constitution which deals with international relations.
Accordingly, a referendum was held which amended Article 29
by authorizing the State to become a member of the European
Economic Community,1 3 the European Coal and Steel Community,14 and the European Atomic Energy Community. 15 At a
later date further amendments were passed, also by referendum,
to authorize the State to ratify the Single European Act' 6 and the
Treaty on European Union," commonly referred to as the Maastricht Treaty. The Irish Government, however, amended the
Constitution to contain also the following far reaching provision:
No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted,
acts done or measures adopted by the State necessitated by
the obligations of membership of Communities or prevents
laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the Communities, or institutions
thereof, from having the force of law in
8
the State.1
The Irish, like many other Member States of the European
Community, preferred not to acknowledge that they were sur10. Id. art. 34.3.2.
11. Id. art. 46.
12. Id. art. 29.
13. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987).
14. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,
261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty], as amended in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987).
15. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter Euratom Treaty], as amended in TREATIES ESTABLISHING
THE: EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off I Pub. Off. 1987).
16. Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter
SEA] (amending EEC Treaty, supra note 15).
17. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU] (amending EEC Treaty, supra note 13).
18. IR. CONST. arL 29.4.5.
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rendering part of their national sovereignty. Indeed, advocates
of closer European integration avoid the words "transfer" or
"surrender" of sovereignty and prefer to refer to Member States
as "pooling" their sovereignty for the benefit of all. These advocates argue that this "pooling" is a process by which the Member
States lose little and gain much. In Ireland's case this has certainly been true. Prior to entry into the European Community,
Ireland was formally independent but, in fact, largely under the
economic domination of Great Britain. Since joining the European Community, Ireland's freedom of economic and political
action has increased immensely, but at the same time the Irish
people, by virtue of the constitutional amendment to Article 29,
have become subject to a system of Community law which, where
applicable, overrules not only the common and statutory law of
Ireland but its Constitution as well. As a former Judge of the
Irish Supreme Court wrote, "[i]t is as if the People of Ireland
had adopted Community law as a second but transcendent Constitution." 9
I. BACKGROUND TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
A. Treaties
The European Union, as it is now known, is based on five
great international treaties.2 0 In the context of international
law, these-treaties are just like any other treaties between states.
What distinguishes them from other international treaties is that
they establish lawmaking institutions and create obligations and
rights which bind the Member States and their citizens. In short,
these treaties create.a community and provide for governance of
the community by law. Community law is not international law
but it is the internal law of the community. Community lawyers
work, as it were, under the roof of the treaties and for them the
treaties are their constitution.
The most important of the treaties is the treaty signed at
Rome in 1957 which created the European Economic Community ("EEC Treaty") and is usually referred to as the Treaty of
19. Seamus Henchy, The Irish Cortitution and the E.E.C., 12 DuKE L.J. 20, 23

(1977).
20. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (delineating five treaties establish-

ing European Union).
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Rome. 1 In 1992, the Treaty Establishing the European Community2 2 ("EC Treaty") amended the EEC Treaty. All of the treaties
are concerned with economic matters but it would be foolish to
assume that the dynamic which drives them is purely economic.
Rather, the driving force is political.
Essentially, the treaties seek to eliminate the possibility of
war between European nations, particularly between France and
Germany. Thus, the EC Treaty announces in its preamble that
its purpose is to create "an ever closer union."2 s It is not difficult
to know where the inspiration for this comes from. Clearly the
inspiration is the U.S. Constitution and its reference to "a more
perfect union."2 4 But while the preamble to the U.S. Constitution refers to the "the people" of the United States the preamble
to the EC Treaty refers to the "peoples" of Europe.
A difficulty arises when one attempts to compare the institutions of the European Community with those of the United
States. To begin with, there is no clear distinction between Federal Powers and State Powers. Next, there is no system of Federal Courts operating throughout the European Community. Finally, if one attempts to apply the theory of the separation of
powers to the European Community one is confronted with the
realization that there exist four great institutions of government
instead of three, and it is hard to describe any one of them as
being either the legislative or the executive branch.
Although the citizens of the European Union directly elect
the European Parliament ("Parliament"), it has virtually no lawmaking power. The Council of Ministers ("Council") is the
dominant lawmaking authority in the European Community, but
its members consist of representatives from the various governments of the various Member States who are answerable, not to
the Parliament, but to their respective national parliaments.
The Council also possesses certain executive powers. There exists an ongoing struggle for power between the Parliament and
the Council but the Council remains the dominant lawmaker.
Some people would like to see a situation develop where the European Commission ("Commission") would become totally an21. EEC Treaty, supra note 13.
22. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporatingchanges made by TEU, supra note 19.
23. Id., pmbl., [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 573.
24. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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swerable to Parliament and the Council would become the Senate of the European Union.
The Commission is the principal administrative body of the
European Community. The Commission has executive and
some law making powers. Its members are nominated by the
various Member States for a fixed term but are independent in
the exercise of their office. The Commission is not answerable
to the Council but it may have its budget rejected by Parliament
or may be dismissed as a body by Parliament. Finally, there is the
European Court of Justice ("ECJ" or "Court") who ensures that
the law shall prevail in the administration of the affairs of the
community.
The ECJ and the Commission have been extremely successful in their work, and there can be no doubt that the European
Community is a community governed by law. It is also a community of democratic states. But, in view of the weakness of the
European Parliament, it is possible to argue that it is not a democratic community. This is what is referred to as the "democratic
deficit."
B. Reference Procedure
Under Article 177 of the EC Treaty, 5 a court in any Member State may, and a court of final appeal if requested by one of
the parties must, refer any question of European law which may
be in dispute between the parties to the ECJ sitting in Luxembourg.2 6 The ECJ interprets the relevant provision of Community law but the national court of each Member State ascertains
the facts of the case and applies the law to the facts. Therefore,
the national judge becomes the ultimate enforcer of Community
law. He is obliged, even in his own court, to give precedence to
Community law even over the constitutional law of his own country. The national judge, in essence, becomes a community judge
and fruitful cooperation exists between the national judges in
the various Member States and the ECJ in Luxembourg. For this
reason, there is no necessity under the EC system for a separate
system of Federal Courts. It also accounts for why it is easy for
the outsider to miss the extent of the revolution which has taken,
25. EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 177, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689.
26. Id.; see Carl Otto Lenz, The Role and Mechanisms of the Preliminary Ruling Procedure, 18 Fordham Int'l L.J. 388 (1994) (detailing Article 177 reference to ECJ by member state courts on matters of community law).
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and is taking, place in the domestic law of the Member States of
the European Union.
C. Penetrationof National Law
Article 189 of the EC Treaty 7 vests in the Council of Ministers and also in the Commission the power to make legislation
binding on the European Community. 28 This legislation can
take the form of regulations or of directives. A regulation has
general application, is binding in its entirety, and is directly applicable in each of the Member States. Therefore, a citizen may
invoke a regulation against his own government. On the other
hand, a directive is binding on each of the Member States but
the choice of how to implement the directive is left to each national government.
The ECJ has interpreted the EC Treaty and the lawmaking
power in such a way as to emphasize the predominance of Community law. For instance, some of the provisions of the EC
Treaty require, on their face, the making of a community regulation before they can have direct effect in the domestic law of the
Member States. The Court has drawn the inference that the
other provisions of the EC Treaty take effect in the domestic law
of the Member States without any community regulation or any
national legislation. Moreover, because directives do not take
direct effect in the domestic law of the Member States in the
absence of national legislation implementing them, the ECJ will
not permit a national government which is in default through
non-implementation of a directive to use its own default to gain
advantage over one of its citizens in litigation. Furthermore, if
the provisions of a directive are clear and the date by which it
should have been implemented has passed, the ECJ will allow
the citizen to invoke the directive against his national government. Again, while the Commission has the power to prosecute
before the ECJ any national government which has failed to implement a directive within the time prescribed, the Court will
also permit a citizen who has suffered damage as a result of the
failure of the national government to implement the directive to
sue the government for compensation. This notion is referred
to as "vertical penetration" of domestic law by Community Law.
27. EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 189, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 693.
28. Id.
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Finally, there are circumstances in which private citizens may invoke Community legislation in their own national litigation, and
this is referred to as "horizontal" penetration of domestic law by
Community law.
II. WHAT IS THE RESULTING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
COMMUNITY AND NATIONAL LAW?
It is possible to isolate three pillars of this emerging legal
order which form the basis of any discussion of the relationship
between Community law and the laws of individual Member
States. These three pillars are the supremacy of Community
Law, the effectiveness of Community Law in national courts, and
state liability for breach of Community Law.
A. The Supremacy of Community Law
1. The Supremacy of Community Law in General
If the emerging Community was to be more than the Europe
des Nations envisaged by Charles de Gaulle, then establishing the
primacy of Community Law was essential and it would be futile
to attempt a new cohesive legal order if each Member State
could override any Community Law that was inconsistent with its
domestic legal provisions. In this context it is instructive to refer
to the rationale behind the principle of supremacy as described
by a former judge of the EGJ:
The Community legal order is intended to bring about a
profound transformation in the conditions of life - economic,
social, and even political - in the Member States. It is inevitable that it will come into conflict with the established legal
order, that is to say the rules in force in the Member States
whether they stem from constitutions, laws, regulations, or
legal usage ....
Community law holds within itself an existential necessity for supremacy. If it is not capable in all circumstances of taking precedence over all national law, it is ineffective and, to that extent, non-existent. The very notion of a
common order would be destroyed. 9
The treaties do not expressly declare the primacy of Community law, as is the case in some other jurisdictions governed by
29.

PiERRE PESCATORE, L'ORDREJUDIQUE DES COMMUNAUTikS EUROPIENNES

ed. 1973).

227 (2d
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a constitution, such as the United States' ° or Canada.3 1 Nonetheless, the ECJ established this primacy at an early stage in the
Community's development. In its landmark judgement in Costa
v. ENEL,3 2 the ECJ took the opportunity to put the matter beyond doubt.
Flaminio Costa believed that the Italian law establishing the
ENEL electricity company offended Community law, including
Articles 37 and 92 through 94 of the EC Treaty3 3 which govern
state aids to industry and state monopolies. Having refused to
pay his electricity bill for 1950 italian lire, he was brought to
court and pleaded that the Italian law establishing the ENEL
electricity company violated Community law. The case was referred to the ECJ which responded in unambiguous terms to the
Italian Government's defense of its national law:
The transfer by the States from their domestic legal system to
the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of
their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral
act incompatible
with the concept of the Community cannot
34
prevail.
Even though Costa's challenge was ultimately unsuccessful,
it established that "the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of its special and
original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called into question." 35 Implicit in such a decision is a rejection of the general rule that lex posteriori derogat lex anteriori,
preventing a Member State from attempting to enact its own law
overriding an earlier Community law.
In InternationaleHandelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr,3 6 the ECJ further developed this theme to grant primacy to Community law
over national constitutions. A potential conflict arose between a
Community regulation and the fundamental rights enshrined in
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

U.S. CONST. art. 6, c. 2.
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) art. s.52(1).
Costa v. ENEL, [1964] E.C.R. 585, [1964] 1 C.M.L.R. 425.
EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 37, 92-94, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 605-06, 630-32.
Costa, [1964] E.C.R. at 593-594, [1964] 1 C.M.L.R. at 433.
Id. at 594, [1964] 1 C.M.L.R. at 456.
Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, [1972] C.M.L.R. 255.
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the German Basic Law, Grundsatz. The ECJ's decision confirmed
that European Community law enjoyed complete supremacy
over any national law by noting that: "the validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental
State or the prinrights as formulated by the constitution of that
37
ciples of a national constitutional structure."
In order to balance the protection of fundamental human
rights in the Community against the supremacy of Community
law, the ECJ has begun to draw upon national constitutions, international treaties, and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 38 in order
to define its own catalogue of fundamental rights which have
become part of Community law.3 9
To conclude this exposition of the supremacy of Community law, the position may be summarized thus: where an actual
conflict between Community and national law arises, as a consequence of the supremacy of Community law, national courts
throughout the Member States have a duty to give full and instantaneous precedence to the Community law in question and
set aside national provisions conflicting with that Community
40
law.
The ECJ's insistence upon supremacy illustrates the point
made earlier that in Ireland and throughout the European
Union the character of Community law is much closer to that of
constitutional law than to that of international law generally. 41 It
is interesting to compare, for example, the ECJ's judgement in
Costa with the spirit of the judgement of Justice Joseph Story in
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,42 which stated, "[t]he people had a
right to prohibit to the states the exercise of any powers which
were, in their judgement, incompatible with the general compact [and] to make the powers of the State governments, in
37. InternolionaleHandelsgesellschaft, [1970] E.C.R. at 1134, [1972] C.M.L.R. at 264.
38. 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5.
39. See, e.g., Nold v. Commission, Case 4/73, [1974] E.C.R. 491, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R.
338; Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3727, [1980] 3
C.M.L.R. 42; Regina v. Kirk, Case 63/83, [1984] E.C.R. 2689, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 522.
40. See Amminstrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, Case 106/77,
[1978] E.C.R. 629, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 263.
41. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (describing nature of Community
Law as supreme to national law).
42. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816).
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given cases, subordinate to those of the nation."4 3
2. Recognition of Supremacy in the Irish Courts
According to Chief Justice Thomas Finlay of the Irish
Supreme Court in Crotty v. An Taoiseach," "the decisions of [the
ECJ] on the interpretation of the Treaty and on questions covering its implementation take precedence, in case of conflict, over
the domestic law and the decisions of national courts of Member
States." 45 This statement can be contrasted against the place of
international law in the Irish legal order as summarized by the
court in In the Matter of Gearoid O'Laighleis,4 6 "[w]here there is an
irreconcilable conflict between a domestic statute and the principles of international law or the provisions of an international
convention, the Courts administering the domestic law must give
47
effect to the statute."
An interesting test of Irish acceptance of this principle arose
in Pesca Valentia Ltd. v. The Ministerfor Fisheries.' Irish law stipulated that boats fishing within the exclusive fishing territory of
the State must contain a crew made up of seventy-five percent or
more of Irish nationals. On one of the plaintiffs boats, the entire crew were of Spanish nationality and, therefore, the boat was
arrested and its master was charged with the offence of fishing
otherwise than in accordance with the seventy-five percent requirement.
Pesca Valentia challenged this provision as discriminating
between nationals of different Member States and sought, inter
alia, an interlocutory injunction suspending the application of
the relevant national provision until the ECJ had pronounced on
the matter. The Irish Supreme Court granted the injunction,
notwithstanding that such relief suspended the application of a
national law. Implicit in such a decision is both a respect for,
and a recognition of, the supremacy of Community law.
Finally, it is often the case that domestic law is introduced in
order to give effect to a Community provision such as a directive.
One might wonder whether this affects the supremacy of that
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 322.
[1987] I.R. 713 (Ir. S.C.).
Id. at 769.
[1960] I.R. 93 (Ir. H. Ct).
Id. at 103.
[1985] I.R 193 (Ir. S.C.).
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Community provision. If a Community law. takes the form of a
national law, does this deprive it of its primacy over other national laws? The Irish Supreme Court addressed this matter in
Meagher v. MinisterforAgriculture4 9 where Justice John Blayney analyzed such an implementing measure by saying, "[i] t is only in
form that it is part of domestic law. It derives its force from the
directive which is binding on the State as to the results to be
achieved." 5 ° Thus, it appears that the dependency of a Community law upon national implementing measures does not affect
its supremacy over the national laws of Ireland or any other
Member State.
B. The Effectiveness of Community Law in National Courts
The genesis of a determination to secure the effectiveness
of Community law in Member States lies in Article 5 of the EC
Treaty which provides, "Member States shall take all appropriate
measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of
the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action
taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate
the achievement of the Community's tasks. " -" It is accepted
practice that Member States will occassionally, either deliberately
or inadvertently, fail to fulfill their undertaking given in Article
5, thereby frustrating the tangible effect of Community law in
individual Member States. This, coupled with a lack of measures
for the effective enforcement of Community laws, obviously affected the resulting relationship between Community law and
national law.
To counteract such inaction and save Community law from
becoming little more than a hollow aspiration, the ECJ has
adopted an active approach which has ensured a close and effective bond between the Community legal order and its national
counterparts.
One product of this activism has been the adoption of the
concept of "direct effect". When a Community provision is of
the direct effect type, it confers rights and imposes obligations
which may be invoked before, and if so invoked, must be recog49. (1994] I.R. 329 (Ir. S.C.).
50. Id. at 360.
51. EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 5, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 591.
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nized and enforced by the courts of the individual Member
States, including Ireland.
As a consequence of the supremacy of Community law, such
a directly effective provision can be employed to override a conflicting national law. Thus, a directly effective Community provision is simultaneously part of, and superior to, Irish law. In the
recent Irish case of Tate v. Ministerfor Social Welfare, Ireland and
the Attorney General,12 a directly effective Community law was described as "not... constitutional law or statute law. It is still
community law governed by community law but with domestic
effect. And it is in that form that it is part of domestic law." 5
The following caveat, however, should be sounded at the outset.
Direct effect, does not, per se, invariably mean that a given provision can be relied upon as against all parties, for example,
against a member State and against private persons.
An assessment of the true effectiveness of Community provisions requires a brief consideration of two relevant species of direct effect, vertical direct effect, and horizontal direct effect.
Vertical direct effect means that the provision in question may
be invoked only against a Member State or an emanation of that
Member State. Such a provision may not be enforced against
private persons, whether legal or human. In recent years the
ECJ, however, has sought to widen the ambit of vertical direct
effect beyond merely the Member State. The Court has done
this primarily through development of the "emanation of the
State" doctrine to include within that phrase "organisations
which [are] subject to the authority or control of the State or
[have] special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable to relations between individuals." 54 In contrast to vertical direct effect, a provision enjoying horizontal direct effect may be invoked against private parties such as legal
and human persons.
Admittedly, the doctrine of direct effect is not unique to
Community law. It is, however, highly significant in the Community context. This significance is due not only to the effect of the

52. [1995] I.L.R.M. 507 (Ir. S.C.).
53. Id. at 521 (CarrollJ.).
54. Foster v. British Gas pic, Case C-188/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3313, 3348, [1991] 2
C.M.L.R. 833, 856-57.
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doctrine but also to the extent of its application in the Community legal order.
1. The Effect of the Doctrine of Direct Effect
Direct effect exemplifies the fact Community law generally
has acquired a character far removed from that of international
law generally. For example, one fundamental principle of public international law is that international obligations are addressed to states, not to individuals, and therefore, cannot be
invoked by individuals until incorporated into national law. This
principle is dispensed with by direct effect, which empowers individuals to invoke Community law in their national courts regardless of any action or inaction of their Member State. The
ECJ has held that direct effect may apply not only to articles of
the Treaties, but also to secondary legislation made pursuant to
those Treaties.
2. Direct Effect and Provisions of the Treaties
The doctrine of direct effect was first employed to give teeth
to Community law in the context of the articles of the EC Treaty.
In van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen,5 5 the question
arose "whether Article 12 of the Treaty has direct application in
national law in the sense that nationals of Member States may on
the basis of the Article lay claim to rights which the national
court must protect." 6 The Court's response has been quoted
repeatedly in the intervening years, but is nonetheless instructive
in assessing the relationship between Community law and Irish
law:
[T]he Community constitutes a new legal order of international law . . .the subjects of which comprise not only the
Member States but also their nationals. Independently of the
legislation of Member States, Community law therefore not
only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended
to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal
heritage. 7
The result was that Article 12 produced "direct effects in the re55. [1963] E.C.R. 1, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. 105.
56. Id. at 11, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. at 128.
57. Id. at 12, [1968] 2 C.M.L.R. at 129.
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lationship between Member States and their subjects."5 8
Decisions such as that in Van Gend en Loos 9 do not extend
to the entire EC Treaty. The question of whether or not a given
EC Treaty provision is of direct effect is confined to the particular provision in dispute, depending on whether the obligation
which the particular provision creates is sufficiently unconditional and precise to enable a national court to identify and enforce that obligation.' Since 1963, the Court has considered
the effect of most of the provisions of the EC Treaty, and of
those considered, approximately two-thirds have been deemed
to be of direct effect. Because EC Treaty articles are considered
in this ad hoc manner, it will be some time before the ECJ produces a similar commentary upon the amendments that the
Treaty on European Union of 1992 introduced to the EC
Treaty.6 1
3. Direct Effect and Secondary Legislation
It was indicated earlier in this Essay that much of the significance of direct effect in the Community context results from the
extent of the principle's application which includes both treaty
articles and secondary legislation. In Community law, secondary
legislation is principally created through regulations and directives, both of which require distinct consideration.
a. Effectiveness of Regulations
Article 189 of the EC Treaty 2 provides, "[a] regulation shall
have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and
directly applicable in all Member States."6" Irish Law dictates
that after the date upon which a regulation enters into force, it
.58. Id. at 13, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. at 130.
59. [19631 E.C.R. at 1, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. at 105.
60. See, e.g., Criminal Proceedings against Alfred Webb, Case 279/80, [1981]
E.C.R. 3305, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 (giving direct effect to Article 59 of EC Treaty);
Criminal Proceedings Against Casati, Case 203/80, [1981] E.C.R. 2615, [1982] 1
C.M.L.R. 365 (denying direct effect to Article 71 of EC Treaty).
61. TEU, supra note 17, [1992] 1 C.M.LR. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247. See R v. Secretary of
State for the Home Dept., ex parte Gerry Adams, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. 476. In Adams,
Article 8a of the EEC Treaty, an amendment inserted by the TEU, was referred for
consideration to the Court when Gerry Adams was banned from entering mainland
Britain, but the reference was withdrawn following the revocation of the relevant ban.
62. EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 189, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 693.
63. Id. An alert reader will have noticed that Article 189 describes regulations as
"directly applicable", as opposed to "of direct effect." The distinction, if any, between
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immediately penetrates the Irish legal order and is, thus, part of
Irish law. A regulation requires no implementing legislation
before it has full force in Irish jurisdiction.' In fact, there is
authority to suggest that a Member State may be prohibited from
enacting its own legislation purporting to give effect to a Community regulation. 65 The rationale underpinning such a stance
is twofold. First, the ECJ is concerned that if Community law is
the source of a given right or obligation, then that source should
not be disguised by national legislation. Second, the uniformity
of Community law as between Member States could be undermined by fifteen separate national laws purporting to give effect
to a common regulation.
b. Effectiveness of Directives
A directive obliges Member States to achieve a specified objective on or before a particular date. When properly implemented, the directive is transposed into national law and thereafter may be relied upon by individuals in, for example, an Irish
court. Article 189(3) of the EC Treaty' provides, "[a] directive
shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each
Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the na67
tional authorities the choice of form and methods."
As previously discussed, theory does not always translate into
practice. The real test of the tangible effect of a directive arises
when it has not been implemented or fully implemented by a
Member State. It is in such circumstances that Community law
strives to distinguish itself from the classical rules of international law. Faced with such pretermission, the Commission has
the option of initiating proceedings against the errant Member
direct effect and direct applicability has not yet been thoroughly considered by the ECJ,
and the Court seems to have used the terms interchangeably.
The distinction, it seems, can be explained in the following way. A provision enjoying direct applicability is immediately and automatically incorporated into national
law. As such, that provision has the potential to be of direct effect. Whether or not the
provision is in fact directly effective depends on whether it creates a sufficiently precise
and unconditional obligation such as can be enforced on behalf of individuals by national courts.
64. Fratelli v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, Case 94/77, [1978]
E.C.R. 99, [1979]

-

C.M.L.R.

__.

65. Id.
66. EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 189(3), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 693.
67. Id.
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State pursuant to Article 169 of the EC Treaty6 which, if
brought to fruition, may result in a declaration under Article
17161 that the State has "failed to fulfil its Community obligations." 70 In practice, the Commission usually seeks to secure
compliance by negotiation at the outset of such proceedings, an
approach which seems to be eminently pragmatic in view of the
unsatisfactory nature of the Article 169 procedure. Following a
declaration under Article 171, a Member State is required to
"take the necessary measures" 7 1 to remedy its failure and comply
with Community law. The ECJ, however, is usually powerless to
ensure genuine compliance by way of fines, retention of Community funds due to the Member State, or otherwise. It is only
in the case of a most recalcitrant State that a recent amendment
enables the Court to impose any penalty payments.72 Moreover,
such penalties are of little use to the intended beneficiary of the
directive, the individual citizen.
It was in this context that the ECJ had to assess the difficulty
of giving tangible effect to Community law which takes the form
of a directive. Was it possible to extend the doctrine of direct
effect to directives and allow judicial activism to succeed where
the draftsman's pen had failed? Based on the terms used in Article 189(3),7- directives might seem to be incapable of direct effect because, unlike regulations, they require implementation by
individual Member States in order to become an integral part of
national law. Notwithstanding the wording of Article 189, the
E CJ, desiring to distinguish Community law from international
law generally and provide it with tangible effect in every Member
State, has held that directives can in certain circumstances enjoy
74
a form of direct effect.
In order for a directive to be given direct effect, it appears
that the directive must create an obligation which is sufficiently
68. Id. art. 169, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686.
69. Id. art. 171, [1992] 1 C.M.L.IL at 687.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Cf EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 171(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 687. Article
171(2) is an amendment inserted by the TEU, which provides for "appropriate" penalties following a second set of Article 169 proceedings initiated after the Member State
has failed to comply with the original Article 171 judgement.
73. EC Treaty, supra note 22, 189(3), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 693.
74. See, e.g., Van Duyn v. Home Office, Case 41/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1337, [1975] 1
C.M.L.RL 1.
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precise and unconditional to enable the national court to identify and enforce it, and the time limit for implementation of the
directive by the Member State must have expired before the date
of the proceedings in which the directive is invoked. The case of
Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti illustrates this latter criterion.75 In
1978, Ratti sought to rely upon two unimplemented directives in
a national court. The deadline for transposition into national
law of the first directive, set for December 12, 1974 had expired,
but the deadline for implemention of the second directive was
not until November 9, 1979. Therefore, only the first could be
of direct effect and the defendant could only invoke that directive. This principle is based on a quasi-estoppel approach which
seeks to prevent a wayward Member State from benefiting as a
result of its failure to give full effect to Community law.
In keeping with this estoppel argument and that Article
189(3) is directed at Member States, a directive can have, at
most, vertical effect only. Despite the opinion of Advocate General76 Carl Otto Lenz inviting the Court to depart from its earlier
decisions and to grant horizontal effect to directives, the ECJ recently reaffirmed this position in Faccini Dori v. Recreb Srl.77 A
possible argument for the retention of the status quo is that it
would be inequitable to grant horizontal effect to unimplemented directives if to do so would impose obligations and consequent sanctions upon individuals where such persons had not
breached any national law, and had no role in the failure to implement the relevant Community law.
Finally, it is worth remarking that the Court has attempted
to bestow some sort of effectiveness upon directives which, for
whatever reason, do not enjoy direct effect. This has been done
by relying on Article 5 to conclude that each Member State's
75. Case 148/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1629, [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. 96.
76. The office of Advocate General is a suigeneris one with which the North American reader may be unfamiliar. There are currently nine Advocates General from various Member States who, while they are members of the ECJ, act independently of the
Court. Article 166 of the Treaty provides, "it shall be the duty of the Advocate General,
acting with complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned
submissions on cases brought before the Court ofJustice, in order to assist the court in
the performance of the task assigned to it in Article 164." EC Treaty, supra note 22, art.
166, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R at 685. The ECJ is free to accept or depart from the opinion of
an Advocate General. See Nial Fennelly, Reflections of an Irish Advocate General, 5 IRISH J.
EUR. L. 5 (1996) (providing thorough consideration of office of Advocate General).
77. Case 91/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-3325, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R 665.
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obligation in that Article extends to the courts of that Member
State. Therefore, "in applying national law... national courts
are required to interpret their national law in light of the wording and purpose of the directive." 78 More recently, in Marleasing
SA v. La Comercial International de Alimontacion SA, 7 a the Court
established that such mandatory judicial interpretation applies
to national law enacted both prior to and after the relevant directive.
Left unqualified, such a ruling could have far-reaching effects for the judiciary in national courts. An Irish court, for example, may have interpreted a statute in a particular way some
years ago and, as a consequence of a directive which has not yet
been transposed into national law, may have to depart from its
own precedent in order to construe the statute in a manner
which accords with the terms of a directive which is not of direct
effect. The ECJ, however, has recognized the understandable
disquiet of some national legal systems at such a prospect and
has conceded that such "indirect effect" is not absolute. In the
Von Colson case, it was stated that the obligation to construe national law in light of a directive applies only "insofar as [the na80
tional courts have] a discretion to do so under national law."
Later in Marleasing,the obligation imposed was to interpret national law in light of the not directly effective directive "as far as
possible," indicating that a respect for legal certainty in the national courts tempers the Court's zeal.
c. Effectiveness of Decisions
In addition to regulations and directives, Article 18981 refers
to decisions and provides that a decision of the Council or Commission shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is
addressed. 2 It is implicit in Article 189 that any such decision
must be "substantiated," by having a provision of one of the treaties as a foundation. Decisions which create a sufficiently precise
and unconditional obligation are of direct effect as against their
78. Von Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83, [1984] E.C.1R 1891,
[1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430.
79. Case C-106/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-4135, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 305.
80. Von Colson, (1984] E.C.R. at 1909, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. at 454.
81. EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 189, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 693.
82. Id.
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addressees."3 If the addressee is a Member State, then the decision may be relied upon against that Member State in a national
court. In addition, the decision may be relied upon as against
emanations of the Member State as discussed earlier in the context of vertical effect. If the addressee of the decision is an individual there would appear to be, in principle, no reason why
such a decision could not be capable of direct effect once it satisfied the standard test for such effect. Hence, it would be open to
a third party to invoke the decision against the individual addressee in, for example, the Irish High Court. In practice, such
a scenario is unlikely to arise for a number of reasons, principally
because decisions addressed to individuals are usually based on
EC Treaty articles which are directly effective anyway. Thus, the
quest to rely upon any such decision would be an unnecessary
one because that decision merely applied a set of rights and obligations which, because of their direct effect, were already at the
plaintiff's disposal independent of the relevant decision.
III. MEMBER STATE LIABILITY FOR THE BREACH OF
COMMUNITY LAW
A. Member State Liability Generally
Thus far, it should be clear that the ECJ has consistently
striven to ensure the binding and tangible effect of Community
law throughout the Member States. Supremacy, the concept of a
new legal order, the permanent transfer of sovereign rights, direct effect, and indirect effect may all be viewed as tools the
Court employs in its quest to breathe life into Community law.
This quest is frustrated when Member States fail to implement
their Community obligations. The Court's initial response to
this problem was to import the concept of direct effect into
Community law. Yet, while direct effect may have satisfied individual cases, it did not address a central problem, namely, the
failure of Member States to implement directives. To remedy
this, the Court has introduced another significant weapon into
the Community law arsenal, Member State liability for breach of
Community law.
In Francovich v. Italy,84 the ECJ enunciated this novel con83. Grad v. Finanzamt Transtein, Case 9/70, [1970] E.C.R, 825, [1971] 1 C.M.L.R.
1.
84. Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5357, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 66.
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cept. Such liability is entirely independent of the principles so
far considered in this Essay. Francovich concerned the failure of
a Member State, Italy, to implement a directive designed to protect employees of companies which became insolvent. Article 3
of Directive 80/987 provided, "measures must be taken [by
Member States] to ensure the payment of [employees'] outstanding claims resulting from contracts of employment or employment relationships and relating to pay for a period prior to a
date determined by the Member State."8 5
The plaintiffs in Francovich were employees of insolvent
companies which owed them arrears of wages. Because their former employers were insolvent they had to seek compensation
from a source with deeper pockets, the Italian Government.
Their claim, which originated in the Italian courts, was two-fold.
They argued that the provisions of the directive were of direct
effect and that they were entitled to damages as a result of Italy's
failure, through non-implementation of the Directive, to meet
the obligations which Community law imposed on it.
The national courts referred the cases to the ECJ under Article 177 of the EC Treaty. 86 The ECJ seized this opportunity to
consolidate the effectiveness of Community law by ruling that, in
principle, a Member State may be liable to compensate individuals for loss, where a breach of Community law for which that
Member State is responsible causes that loss. The source of such
liability was the obligation imposed by Article 5 of the EC Treaty
coupled with the fact the effet utile, or full effectiveness, of Community law would be undermined if individuals were powerless
to obtain redress where their loss resulted from the failure of a
Member State to fulfill its obligations under Community law.
The ECJ went on to specify the conditions for establishing
such liability. These conditions depended upon the nature of
the breach of Community law in question. In the case of failure
to implement a directive, as in the Francovichcase, the following
three conditions have to be satisfied before liability will be imposed:
[T]he result required by the Directive must include the conferring of rights for the benefit of individuals; the content of
these rights must be determinable by reference to the provi85. Id. at 5409, 1 15, [1992] 2 C.M.L.R. at 110.
86. EC Treaty, supra note 22, art. 177, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689.
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sions of the Directive; and there must be a causal link between the breach of the obligation of 7the state and the damage suffered by the persons affected.
Recently, the ECJ has elucidated the conditions of liability
applicable to other types of breaches of Community law. A series
of cases in 1996 exemplified various other ways in which a Member State may infringe Community law, specifically, the omission
by a Member State to alter its laws so as to accord with an EC
Treaty article,"8 enactment of national legislation that is incompatible with an EC Treaty article,8 9 a decision of a national government which breaches a directly effective EC Treaty provision,9 0 and a timely and bona fide, but incorrect, implementation of a directive. 9 '
To succeed on a claim for compensation for the loss resulting from these infringements of Community law, the Court imposed three conditions. The rule of Community law infringed
upon must be intended to confer rights on individuals, the infringement must be sufficiently serious, and there must be a direct causal link between the state's infringement of Community
law and the loss suffered by the injured party. Presumably, the
meaning of this test, and particularly the second condition
thereof, will be the subject of further consideration in future
cases.
Returning to Francovich, it is significant that the right to
compensation was deemed to arise wholly independently of the
doctrine of direct effect. Thus, the fact that the Directive was
held not to be of direct effect did not preclude the plaintiffs
from succeeding in their claim against the Member State for
compensation. Indeed, some commentators have submitted
that the ECJ could have construed the Directive's provisions as
directly effective but chose not to do so in order to emphasize
that direct effect is not a prerequisite in a claim for compensation for loss resulting from a Member State's failure to observe
87. Francovich, [1991] E.C.R. at 5415, 39-40, [1992] 2 C.M.L.R. at 114-15.
88. Brasserie du Pkcheur v. Germany and R v. Sec. of State for Transport, ex parte
Factortame, Joined Cases C46 & 48/93, [1996] E.C.R. 1-102, [1996] .1 C.M.L.R. 889.
89. Id.
90. Regina v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas
(Ireland) Ltd., Case C-5/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-2553, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 391.
91. Regina v. H.M. Treasury, ex pare British Telecommunications plc., Case 392/
93, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1631, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 217.
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Community law. In addition, it is worth noting that the ECJ has
stated that the converse position is also true. Because a finding
of direct effect is only a minimum guarantee of the effectiveness
of Community law, it does not bar a parallel action seeking compensation for loss suffered by an individual as a result of a
breach of Community law attributable to a Member State.9 2
Significantly, the ECJ in Francovichsaw fit to apply the axiom
of Community law that in the absence of Community rules governing a particular area, it is incumbent upon each Member
State to provide its own form of regulation. The application of
this axiom in Francovich led the ECJ to rule that each Member
State is obliged to remedy the loss "within the context of national law on liability."9" The effect of this decision is that following the ruling in Francovich, the assessment of damages and the
rules governing an action for damages are matters for national
law, provided that such national laws are not less favorable to a
plaintiff than those governing similar claims for reparation following breaches of national law, and do not make it effectively
impossible for a Francovich-type plaintiff to succeed in the national courts. This element of the judgment may be seen as an
indication of a wish to prevent the alienation of national courts
in the Community law dynamic by bestowing upon them an input into this "new legal order" and, thereby, adding another
layer to the already complex ebb and flow between Community
law and national law.
Ireland's application of Francovich is illustrated by the recent
High Court decision in Tate.9 4 In fact, the illustrative value of
the Tate case transcends the limited question of damages for loss
suffered as a consequence of a breach of Community law by the
Member State. The case offers a revealing insight into the relationship between Community law and national law in the Irish
legal order generally. As such, Tate demonstrates the workings
of several of the themes introduced in the foregoing pages and
merits more detailed consideration.

92. Cf Brasseriedu Picheur, [1996] E.C.R. at 1029, 20, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889 at
20.
93. Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Francovich, [1991] at 5383, 1 44, [1992]
2 C.M.L.R. at 45.
94. Tate, [1995] 1 I.L.R.M. at 507.
985,
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B. Tate v. Minister for Social Welfare
Council Directive 79/795 seeks to establish equal treatment
between men and women in the field of social security and prohibits, inter alia, all discrimination on grounds of sex in such
matters. Prior to the Directive, Irish social security law was exclusively governed by the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act of
1981, part of which was based on the principle that a married
woman was deemed to be the dependant of her husband if she
was living with him or was wholly or mainly maintained by him.
A husband, by contrast, was only deemed to be a dependant of
his wife if he was incapable of self-support because of some physical or mental infirmity and was being wholly or mainly maintained by her. One result of the 1981 Act was that married women suffered discrimination both as to the amount of unemployment benefits they received and as to the duration of their
eligibility for those benefits.
Under Article 8 of the Directive, the deadline for implementation was December 23, 1984. However, it was not until
November 21, 1986 that any of the Directive's provisions were
implemented through the Social Welfare Act of 1985, which effected certain changes so as to bring about the required equality
from that date forth. Another six years passed before the relevant Government Minister, acting under Section 3 of the European Communities Act 9 6 introduced the European Communities (Social Welfare) Regulations in 1992 which enabled the
making of supplementary payments to compensate for the differences in payments as between married men and married women
during the period between December 23, 1984, the expiration of
the period for implementation of the Directive, and November
21, 1986, the date when the Irish implementing legislation took
effect. These 1992 Regulations, although designed to wipe the
slate clean, did not compensate for all the differences which existed during that twenty-three month period. They failed to address discrimination in relation to certain social welfare allowances such as the adult dependency allowance and the child
dependency allowance.
The plaintiffs were all married women who claimed that
from December 23, 1984 on, they were entitled to have the same
95. O.J. L 6/24 (1979).
96. European Communities Act, 1972 (Eng.).
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rules applied to them and receive the same benefits that were
applied and paid to married men in similar circumstances.
Their claim was assisted by the ruling of the ECJ in Cotter and
McDermott v. Ministerfor Social Welfare9 7 which established that the
relevant article of Directive 79/7 "is sufficiently precise and unconditional to allow individuals, in the absence of national implementing measures, to rely upon it before the national courts
as from 23 December 1984, in order to preclude the application
of any national provision inconsistent with that article""8 and
that in the absence of national measures implementing the Directive "women are entitled to have the same rules applied to
them as are applied to men who are in the same situation, since,
where the directive has not been implemented, those rules remain the only valid point of reference."9 9
Relying upon Cotter and McDermott and Francovich,the plaintiffs in Tate sought to establish that they had suffered discrimination contrary to the terms of the Directive because the relevant
national law provided to married men in like circumstances payments to which the plaintiffs were not entitled, and when the
1992 Regulations were introduced to address this discrimination,
the compensatory payments made by those Regulations failed to
include an element of compensation, by way of interest due or
otherwise, for the lateness of those payments. Moreover, invoking the judgement in Francovich, the plaintiffs sought compensation by way of damages for the loss suffered as a result of Ireland's failure to fulfill its Community law obligations. Justice
Mella Carroll accepted the argument that Ireland had failed to
fully or properly implement the Directive and held that as a result of this failure the plaintiffs had suffered discrimination and
consequent financial loss. Given this holding, the issue of compensation for this loss needed to be considered.
Recall that in Francovich,the ECJ left it open to each Member State to provide specific methods of compensation. Before
deciding how to compensate the plaintiffs, Justice Carroll sought
to identify the nature of the wrong committed by the State in
failing to implement Directive 79/7 within the specified time
limit. The learned judge described it as:
97. Case 286/85, [1987] E.C.R. 1453, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 607.
98. Cotter and McDermott, [1987] E.C.R. at 1467, 1 16, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. at 614.
99. Id.
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[A] wrong arising from community law which has domestic
effect. It is not a breach of constitutional rights; it is not a
breach of statutory duty and it is not a breach of the duty of
care. It is a breach of a duty to implement the directive and
it approximates to a breach of constitutional duty.10 0
The Justice went on to say that "in my opinion, the word 'tort' is
sufficiently wide to cover breaches of obligations of the State
under community law. There is nothing strange in describing
the State's failure to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty as a
tort." 10 1 Justice Carroll then granted a declaration that the State
had failed to fully or properly implement the Directive and
awarded damages equivalent to the disparity between the payments made to men and women in like circumstances, increased
by the appropriate amount under the Consumer Price Index.
CONCLUSION
There can be little doubt that the dynamic effect of Community law upon the Irish legal system will continue to grow.
There can be equally little doubt that such influence will continue to be founded upon the abandonment of the classic principles of international law for those of a constitutional system.
Such evolution is the inevitable consequence of ongoing political advances towards a federal-type structure.
The removal of barriers between Member States, the common market, the possibility of a single European currency and
other similar "political" developments all contribute towards
copper fastening the place of Community law in the Irish legal
order and decreasing the chances of a return to the pre-1973
position. In such a context the following observation of Francois
Rene De Chateaubriand seems an appropriate note on which to
conclude that, "quand les barri~res fiscales et commerciales
auront &6 abolies entre les divers Etats, . . . quand les diff6rents
pays en relations journaliires tendront A l'unit6 des peuples,
comment ressusciterez-vous l'ancien mode de s~paration?" 0 2

100. Tate, [1995] 1 I.R.L.M. at 522-525.
101. Id.
102. Lord Gordon Slynn, INTRODUCING A EUROPEAN LEGAL ORDER (Hamlyn
tures), 1992 (quoting CHATEAUBRAND, MfMOIRES D'OUTRE-TOMBE (1841)).
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